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Abstract—Flexibility in power demand, diverse usage patterns
and storage capability of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) grow
the elasticity of residential electricity demand remarkably. This
elasticity can be utilized to form the daily aggregated demand
profile and/or alter instantaneous demand of a system wherein
a large number of residential PEVs share one electricity retailer
or an aggregator. In this paper, we propose a demand response
(DR) technique to manage vehicle-to-grid (V2G) enabled PEVs’
electricity assignments (charging and discharging) in order to
reduce the overall electricity procurement costs for a retailer
bidding to a two-settlement electricity market, i.e., a day-ahead
(DA) and a spot or real-time (RT) market. We show that our
approach is decentralized, scalable, fast converging and does
not violate users’ privacy. Extensive simulations show significant
overall cost savings can be achieved for a retailer bidding to an
operational electricity market by using the proposed algorithm.
This technique becomes more needful when the power grid
accommodates a large number of intermittent energy resources
wherein RT demand altering is crucial due to more likely
contingencies and hence more RT price fluctuations and even
occurring the so-called black swan events. Finally, such retailer
could offer better deals to customers as well.
Index Terms—Black swan event, demand response (DR), elec-
tricity markets, plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), residential load,
retailer, smart grids, vehicle-to-grid (V2G).
I. INTRODUCTION
PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES (PEVs) increase theelasticity of residential electricity demand profile sub-
stantially. In particular, when a retailer provides electricity to
a large number of PEV owner customers, inherent flexibility
in PEVs’ demand, diversity in the usage patterns and energy
storage capability of PEVs could be employed in order to save
electricity costs.
In addition, ambitious plans, aspiring incentives, subsidies
and supports for introducing PEVs and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs) into the transport sector have been set in
many countries [1]. The roadmap is advocating industries and
governments to attain an overall PEV/PHEV sales share of
at least 50% for light duty vehicle (LDV) sales by 2050
worldwide [2].
The future paradigm of electricity markets is a subject
of question and debate as various changes are occurring
that remould existing electricity generation, transmission and
consumption formats. Massive integration of renewables, more
efficient consumption thorough demand response (DR) tech-
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niques and transition of consumers to prosumers are some of
such principal alterations [3].
In a deregulated power grid, electricity retailers submit their
demand bids to the wholesale market. For example, for a day-
ahead (DA) market, these demand bids could often have both a
desired power demand’s quantity and a price component. This
indicates that the retailer buys the specified power quantity,
provided the market clearing price (MCP) is not higher than
its offered price. This bidding process could be implemented
in a few rounds to let the retailers modify and update their
bids prior to the final clearance in the market.
Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection runs
the largest competitive wholesale electricity market on the
globe [4]. The average prices of electricity per MWh for DA
and RT markets which have been sold over year 2014 are very
close, i.e., $48.9539 and $48.2063, respectively [5]. However,
this fact may misrepresent the nature of these two markets at
the first glance. The details about hourly pricing data for DA
and RT markets could be completely distinct and unpredictable
at several days and/or hours.
In fact, large spikes may be seen due to unexpected im-
balances in supply and demand, for example, when a large
production generator faces a black-out or temperatures are
suddenly changing. Hence, the high uncertainty, particularly in
the RT market, can remarkably impact the overall electricity
procurement cost for a retailer. The spikes could occur more
frequently when the whole grid is relying on numerous inter-
mittent energy resources, e.g., wind farms and solar panels,
where more RT price fluctuations and even so-called black
swan events [6] may be occurred.
On the other hand, mean reversion theory tells us that prices
and returns ultimately proceed back towards the mean or the
average. This mean or average can be the historical average
of the price or return or another sensible mean [7]. In other
words, it is not very likely that the unprecedented spikes keep
on occurring and this lasts long.
A. Summary of Technical Contributions
In the paper, we adopt the flexibility and diversity in the
power demand and availability time of PEVs from real world
data. Then, we propose a cost minimizing algorithm suitable
for the retailers dealing with existing operational markets using
both offline demand shaping and online demand altering. The
contributions of this article can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a fast converging and scalable DR technique
which minimizes the overall electricity procurement cost
for a retailer while preserving the privacy of individual
users.
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2• Our presented algorithm is capable to shape and alter
the aggregated demand profile in response to DA and RT
markets.
• The approach offers a suitable mechanism for the retailer
to decide when and how to respond to price fluctuations
in the RT market.
• We lay our algorithm in a game theory framework which
has a Nash equilibrium (NE) guaranteeing that the pro-
posed approach is yielding to all users’ best turnovers.
• Our presented results are based on an operational elec-
tricity market and available vehicle usage patterns.
B. Related Work
Paper [4] describes the characteristics of the PJM DA and
RT electricity markets. The author discusses that economic
motivations make the DA and RT market prices converge in the
bidding processes. Additionally, locational marginal pricing
(LMP) based markets succour steady grid operations by using
pertinent pricing signals to the retailers.
An overview of demand response (DR) and their various
classifications in a deregulated electricity market is discussed
in [8]. The authors in [9] compare different bidding rules
in wholesale electricity markets when there exist PEVs and
renewables’ penetration in the power grid.
The authors in [10] present a two-stage stochastic optimiza-
tion approach for an electric vehicle (EV) aggregator engaging
in DA and regulation markets to reduce the energy cost by
optimal bidding. Nevertheless, their proposed method impose
some inconvenience on the customers and the aggregator
should have access to private information of the EVs, e.g.,
arrival time, departure time and battery capacity. The same
issue exists in the proposed method in [11]. In [12], the author
discusses how a time-shiftable load, that may comprise of
several time-shiftable subloads, can send demand bids to DA
and RT markets to minimize its electricity procurement cost.
Although this paper provides optimal closed-form solutions for
bidding, they do not seem to be applicable for the residential
sector wherein the retailer does not have detailed information
about customers’ preferences due to privacy concerns.
In [13], we present a statistical modelling and a closed-
form expression for PEVs’ uncoordinated charging demand.
Furthermore, in [14] we propose a decentralized demand
shaping algorithm for a priori known desired demand profiles
for the next day. Our paper [15] provides the idea of joint
shaping and altering the demand briefly.
In [16], charging and discharging of PEVs are managed in
order to maximize the social and individual welfare functions.
However, in residential sector, defining appropriate utility and
welfare functions for the individual users is very ambiguous.
In this paper, we provide a new architecture in which a joint
demand shaping and altering algorithm is used to managing
PEVs’ electricity assignments (charging and discharging). The
objective is minimizing the electricity procurement cost of
a retailer bidding to two-settlement electricity markets, i.e.,
DA and RT markets. This algorithm includes both offline and
online DR. We adopt PJM Interconnection pricing data [5] for
the year 2014 to evaluate our algorithm’s results and efficacy.
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Fig. 1: A basic model of a smart grid comprised of energy market, multiple
retailers and generators, and required communication infrastructure.
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Fig. 2: Multiple retailers serving their subscribed PEV owner residential users.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the underlying model of the
power grid in this paper which contains the energy market, the
electricity retailers, end users and necessary communication
infrastructure. We articulate different parts of this model in
the sequel.
Fig. 1 shows a basic smart power grid model. Independent
system operator (ISO) is supervising the market while gen-
erators and retailers deal electricity in the market. Here, we
assume that retailers can also inject electricity back to the
market and sell it.
In a fully liberated electricity market, the bidding inter-
actions between retailers and generators can be formulated
and modelled as games, e.g., a Stackelberg game [17]. In that
case, the supervisory role of the ISO could be captured into
the game’s formulations and constraints. However, here, we
consider an operational electricity market described by data.
Fig. 2 represents multiple users share one electricity retailer
or an aggregator. Different retailers exist in the power system
and they compete to expand their market capacity by offering
better deals to the customers.
We assume that the users’ overall load consists of two
distinct types of load; typical household load which normally
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Fig. 3: Annual standard deviation σ(t) (2) for each our of a day in PJM for
DA and RT markets.
needs on-demand power supply, e.g., air conditioning, lighting,
cooking, refrigerator, etc, and PEV as a flexible load. In this
model, the dotted lines illustrates the underlying communica-
tion and information system while the solid lines show the
power cabling infrastructure.
We formed the pricing data for PJM market in 2013 into
the following matrix for the DA market:
PDA365,24 =

pDA1,1 p
DA
1,2 · · · pDA1,24
pDA2,1 p
DA
2,2 · · · pDA2,24
...
...
. . .
...
pDA365,1 p
DA
365,2 · · · pDA365,24
 . (1)
The same did we for the RT market. Then, the annual standard
deviation for each hour of a day in PJM DA and RT markets
is found as follows:
σ(t) =
√√√√ 1
365
365∑
i=1
(p
DA/RT
i,t −
1
365
365∑
i=1
(p
DA/RT
i,t )
2,
t = 1, 2, · · · , 24. (2)
Fig. 3 shows the annual hourly standard deviation of the
price for both DA and RT markets in 2013. As it can be
observed and was expected, the spot market’s prices can
deviate much more for most hours of a day.
We assume that a retailer prefers to shape its aggregated
demand profile and emulate it to the profile purchased from
DA market. Then, it is more able to minimize its demand from
the RT market, which is much more prone to price volatility, to
balance the load and accordingly lower the overall electricity
procurement cost for each next day. This cost reduction makes
the energy retailer capable to offer better deals to the customers
in the form of cheaper pricing, random rewarding, promotions,
etc, and expand its market capacity.
In practice, the shaped aggregated profile for the next
day does not exactly matches the retailer’s purchased DA
profile. Hence, the retailer often needs to reciprocate the load
imbalances at each time slot of the following day by buying
electricity from the RT market.
On the other hand, we should notice that residential DR
is desired to be implemented such that users’ privacy is not
violated. Therefore, a DR practising retailer can expect more
participation from the users if the actual DR is implemented in
each user’s house in a decentralized fashion according to our
model. This also lessens the burden of heavy computations on
a central unit and makes the algorithm more scalable.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we first formulate the electricity procurement
cost for the retailer and then provide our proposed joint
demand profile shaping and altering algorithm.
In our analysis, we assume a daily energy assignment
horizon and, without loss of generality, a time granularity of
one hour. Let (ld, pd) represents the pair of load ld and price
pd vectors which has been cleared in the DA market. i.e.,
ld , [ld1 , ld2 . . . , ld24]T , (3)
pd , [pd1, pd2 . . . , pd24]T , (4)
for which, the units of ldi and p
d
i are MWh and $/MWh,
respectively. Similarly, assume that (li, pr) represents the pair
of load li and price pr vectors which are the load imbalance
and RT price vectors in the following day:
li , [li1, li2 . . . , li24]T , (5)
pr , [pr1, pr2 . . . , pr24]T . (6)
The values of the elements of these vectors will be only
known to the retailer only at each time slot of the next day.
Then, the overall electricity procurement cost for the next day
can be formulated as follows:
C =
24∑
t=1
pdt l
d
t +
24∑
t=1
prt l
i
t, (7)
here, C is the overall energy procurement cost over the
energy assignment horizon, i. e., 24 hours.
First, given the purchased profile from the DA market by
the retailer, i.e., ld, the users individually contribute to follow
this demand profile by solving the sequential optimization
problem P1. The objective is to minimize the correlation
between each user’s PEV energy assignment vector lPEV,n
and its own inflexible demand vector lA,n plus the demand
vector from other N − 1 users l−n, and also to maximize the
correlation between lPEV,n and the purchased DA load vector
ld (see Algorithm 1):
P1: minimize
lPEV,n
< lPEV,n, lA,n + l−n − ld >, (8)
4βn∑
t=αn
ltPEV,n = EPEV,n, (9)
|ltPEV,n| ≤ pmax, ∀t ∈ TPPEV,n, (10)
ltPEV,n = 0, ∀t /∈ TPPEV,n, (11)
SOCt=αPEV,n +
t∑
k=α+1
l′kPEV,n ≥ 0.2× CPEV,n,∀t ∈ TPPEV,n.
(12)
in the above, < x, y > shows the inner product or correlation
between vectors x and y and lPEV,n and lA,n show the energy
assignment vectors for user n’s PEV and the aggregated load
from its household appliances, respectively. EPEV,n is the nth
user’s required energy to be allocated to its PEV. Likewise,
αn and βn represent the arrival time and departure time of the
PEV. Furthermore, |ltPEV,n| ≤ pmax limits the maximum power
that can be delivered to/from the PEV and TPPEV,n represents
the permissible charging time set or simply the set of time
slots during the PEV’s connection time to the power grid.
Additionally, l−n is the aggregated power profile from other
N − 1 users described as follows:
l−n =
∑
i∈N
i 6=n
(lPEV,i + lA,i). (13)
In (12), CPEV,n is the total storage capacity of the user n’s PEV
and we assume that in case of employing V2G in the system,
PEV’s state of charge (SOC) should not fall below 20% of
that total capacity for emergency usage and in order to make
sure that the adverse impacts on PEV’s battery lifetime due to
complete depletion are avoided.
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Fig. 4: Altering the demand profile upon a contingency (lowering the demand
at a time slot with unprecedented high RT price).
Second, knowing the fact that (li, pr) is unknown to the
retailer a priori, at each time slot t0 of the next day after getting
this information, the retailer may decide to alter the previously
shaped demand profile to minimize its RT electricity purchase
to balance the load and even sell back some of its pre-
purchased electricity from DA market if the RT price rises
significantly due to the state of the RT market or contingencies.
As the chances for the price to remain that high during all
the next few hours of the day is low, reshaping the load profile
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Fig. 5: Altering the demand profile upon a contingency (lifting the demand
at a time slot with unprecedented low RT price).
by lowering the electricity consumption at that time slot and
purchasing electricity at the next time slots can yield to a lower
cost in practice. This is also true for purchasing electricity
at those time slots when price, unexpectedly, falls down
significantly. The retailer may purchase extra electricity at
those specific time slots (based on the overall storage capacity
coming from connected PEVs) and reshape the demand for
the next hours when the RT prices might be higher, c.f., Fig.
4 and Fig. 5.
We should note that the retailer is assumed to be capa-
ble to indirectly employ the existing flexibility (offered by
each user’s PEV). Nonetheless, the electricity consumption
behaviours of the users (their PEVs’ usage patterns) are not
to be changed and hence the algorithm impose no restrictions
on the users’ comfort. Moreover, users’ privacy is protected
here.
In addition, we use a weighted moving average window as
the threshold γK(t) in Algorithm 1 based on which the retailer
proceeds for RT demand altering:
γK(t) ,
1
K
t∑
i=t−K
wip
r
i , (14)
in which, K is making the length of the window K + 1
time slots and wi is defined as follows:
wi ,
σ(i)
σ(t−K) , i = t−K, · · · , t. (15)
We should note that in the above formulation, for a negative
i, it must be calculated in modulo 24. For instance, if K = 3
and t = 1, then i = −2 and imod 24 = 22. These weights
can be calculated based on history data.
Then, the following linear multi objective programming
(MOP) allows demand altering at time slot t0 when prt0 is
known and can be compared to γK(t) along with pursuing
the shape of the pre-purchased electricity from DA market
(see Algorithm 1):
5P2: min
l′PEV,n
b[λ < l′PEV,n, l
′
A,n + l
′
−n − ld >
+(1− λ)(l′t0−n + lt0A,n + l′t0PEV,n)], (16)
[l
′1
PEV,n, · · · , l
′t0−1
PEV,n] = [l
1
PEV,n, · · · , lt0−1PEV,n], (17)
βn∑
t=t0
l′tPEV,n = EPEV,n −
t0−1∑
t=αn
ltPEV,n, (18)
|l′tPEV,n| ≤ pmax, ∀t ∈ TPPEV,n, (19)
l′tPEV,n = 0, ∀t /∈ TPPEV,n, (20)
SOCt=t0−1PEV,n +
t∑
k=t0
l′kPEV,n ≥ 0.2× CPEV,n,∀t ∈ TPPEV,n.
(21)
In the above, the value of b is either -1 or +1 according to
Algorithm 1, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and (1 − λ) are the weights of the
objective functions. In (21), SOCt=t0−1PEV,n is the SOC of the user
n’s PEV before time slot t0 and, similar to P1, we assume that
in case of employing V2G in the system, the SOC should not
fall below 20% of the total PEV’s storage capacity.
We should note that when λ = 0, ultimate possible
flexibility that can be achieved from PEVs is obtained for
a particular time slot. In this case, however, compliance with
pre-purchased power profile from the DA market is sacrificed.
On the other hand, when λ = 1, there would be no altering in
the profile.
The value of λ mainly depends on the price at time slot
t, the storage capacity of connected PEVs at that time and
the loss due to not following the priori shaped aggregated
demand profile descriptively. In such cases, where it is not
straightforward or impossible to formulate a function, using
a fuzzy approach can help translate descriptive qualities into
functions. An application of this technique is presented in [18]
for adjusting the step sizes in adaptive algorithms.
The convergence criterion in Algorithm 1 can be simply
assumed as a desired number of iterations for updating all
users’ demand profiles or it can be set and subjected to some
predetermined error function, e.g., a desired mean square error
(MSE) between two subsequent iterations of achieving aggre-
gated demand profiles. Furthermore, similarly, as discussed in
[14], a convergence is guaranteed to be obtained and users’
contribution can be modelled as a cooperative game with
complete information wherein a Nash equilibrium exists [14].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the proposed al-
gorithm in the previous section through computer simulations.
In our simulations, the number of users (residential electricity
consumers with PEVs), N , is 1,000 and the optimization
horizon is considered to be a day, i.e., 24 hours for a DA
programming scenario with a time granularity of one hour, i.e.,
duration of each time slot is one hour. Also, K is considered
to be 3 in (14).
For the PEVs usage patterns, i.e., the arrival times, departure
times and vehicles’ energy demands, our data and distributions
Algorithm 1 Offline & Online Demand Response
1: Each user initializes its respective load profile over the
assignment horizon based on its power demands, i.e., ln
for n = 1, . . . , N .
2: All N users send their initialized load profiles to the
retailer.
3: while not reaching convergence do
4: for n = 1 to N do
5: The retailer calculates the state information l−n
according to (13) for user n.
6: The retailer sends (l−n − ld) to user n.
7: User n solves problem P1 and updates its load
profile ln.
8: User n sends back the new demand profile to the
retailer.
9: The retailer updates ln.
10: end for
11: end while
12: for t = 1 to 24 do
13: The retailer receives information from RT market, i.e.,
prt .
14: if (prt 6= γK(t)) then
15: if (prt > γK(t)) then
16: b = +1.
17: else
18: b = −1.
19: end if
20: The retailer proceeds for demand altering.
21: while not reaching convergence do
22: for n = 1 to N do
23: The retailer sends demand altering signal
at time slot t to user n.
24: User n solves problem P2 and updates its
load profile l′n.
25: User n sends back the new demand profile
to the retailer.
26: The retailer updates l′n.
27: The retailer calculates the state information
l′−n according to (13) for user n.
28: end for
29: end while
30: end if
31: end for
are based on 2009 NHTS data [19]. We considered new
standard outlets, NEMA 5-15, with 1.8 kW power output.
Furthermore, SOC for each PEV at the arrival time is as
follows in percentage points:
SOCt=αPEV,n = 100× (1−
EPEV,n
24
). (22)
In other words, we assumed that PEVs are fully charged by
their respective next departure time. Additionally, we consid-
ered 24 kWh energy storage capacity for PEVs according to
Nissan Leaf model [20]. We adopted the PJM interconnection
electricity market pricing data for both DA and RT markets in
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Fig. 6: DA and RT prices for 9 March 2014 in PJM Interconnection electricity
market (the number of days with such black swan behaviour in 2014 is quite
considerable).
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year 2014 [5].
Fig. 6 shows the DA and RT prices for 9 March 2014 as
an example. We selected this day since it had the highest
unexpected peak in RT prices throughout that year in PJM
interconnection and can be assumed as what we earlier referred
to as a black swan event in the market. As it can be observed,
the RT price has a substantial peak at 9.00 A.M. around which
the price is still unexpectedly high for 5 hours. The retailer
proceeds for demand altering program upon receiving the RT
pricing information according to P2. Fig. 7 shows that RT
prices are totally different for one day before and one day
after that day.
Next, we examine the DR scheme introduced in Algorithm
1. Fig. 8 shows the electricity demand profile from only typical
household appliances, i.e., without PEVs and the overall
electricity demand profile when users use PEVs with different
usage patterns based on NHTS data.
To model the power purchased from the DA market on each
day, we assume that the amount of power cleared at each hour
of the following day in the DA market depends on the required
power at that time slot and also includes some randomness as
follows:
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Fig. 8: Electricity demand profile from (a) normal household appliances, i.e.,
without PEVs and (b) the overall electricity demand profile when users use
PEVs with different usage patterns based on NHTS data.
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Fig. 9: An assumed electricity profile purchased by the retailer from the DA
market by the bids that could be cleared.
dcleared(t) = drequired(t) + u, ∀t, (23)
where u’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
chosen from a uniform distribution with the following repre-
sentation:
u ∼ U [−0.2× drequired(t), 0.2× drequired(t)) ∀t. (24)
We used a uniform distribution here as it has the highest
entropy among bounded distributions and gives the highest
uncertainty [21].
Fig. 9 shows the electricity profile purchased by the retailer
from the DA market according to (23) for different hours of a
particular day. The results for shaping the DA demand profile
only and joint shaping and altering the demand, Algorithm 1,
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Fig. 10: Load profiles after using Algorithm 1 for (a) just shaping the demand
P1 and (b) both shaping and altering the demand, Algorithm 1, on 9 March
2014.
TABLE I: OVERALL ENERGY PROCUREMENT COSTS FOR THE RETAILER ON
9 MARCH 2014
Case Overall ideal cost ($) Overall real cost ($) Overall cost after P1 ($) Overall cost after P2 ($)
1 $674.4 $2,808.9 N/A N/A
2 $920.4 $5,865.1 $4,775.6 $4,308.9
is depicted in Fig. 10 1 . For this, we assumed λ = 0.5 in 16.
In our simulations, convergence has been attained only after
one single iteration of updating all users’ electricity demand
profiles for both P1 and P2 in Algorithm 1.
In Table I, we compare the overall energy procurement costs
on 9 March 2014 for the retailer in two cases: case 1) when
there is no PEV in the system and case 2) when all the users
possess PEVs with their respective usage patterns.
It can be noticed that in case 1, if the retailer could be
absolutely successful in bidding to the DA market, i.e., there
would not be any need to purchase electricity from the RT
market (ideal occasion), the overall cost is only $674.4, for
1The simulation was done using MATLABr 7.12.0. The mean simulation
time was 172 seconds on a PC with intel i7-2670QM 2.2 GHz CPU, 6 GB
RAM and Windowsr7 OS.
TABLE II: OVERALL ENERGY PROCUREMENT COSTS FOR THE RETAILER IN
YEAR 2014
Case Overall ideal cost ($) Overall real cost ($) Overall cost after P1 ($) Overall cost after P2 ($)
1 $246,156 $921,664.3 N/A N/A
2 $324,778.3 $1,840,333.8 $1,761,889.1 $1,688,926.1
the pricing shown in Fig. 6. In a more realistic case, when the
retailer’s bidding to the DA market is assumed to be according
Fig. 9, and the retailer is required to balance the load, the
overall cost is remarkably higher. Obviously, demand shaping
and demand altering in this case are not applicable (N/A) as
there is no PEV and hence no power demand elasticity in the
system.
For the second case, when users possess PEVs, for the ideal
bidding, the overall cost increases by almost 37% to supply
electricity to the PEVs whereas for the realistic bidding it
becomes more than double. When demand shaping P1 is em-
ployed, this overall cost reduces by around 18%. Furthermore,
when joint demand shaping and altering in Algorithm 1 is
used, cost decreases further by almost 10%.
In this case, we also assumed that the retailer is allowed to
sell back its extra load purchased earlier from the DA market
to the RT market at the same RT prices in the RT market.
In Table II, we evaluate the proposed technique in Algorithm
1 over the whole year of 2014 according to the PJM inter-
connection data. In this case, as stated in the algorithm, the
retailer proceeds for minimizing its RT demand if prt > γK(t)
and its maximize its purchase from RT market if prt < γK(t).
It is observed that $151,407.7 can be saved in the whole year
for the energy procurement cost of the system by using the
proposed algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a fast converging and decentral-
ized algorithm for managing V2G enabled PEVs’ electricity
assignments (charging and discharging) to lower the overall
electricity procurement cost for an electricity retailer. Our
proposed algorithm uses demand shaping and demand altering
for the DA and the RT markets. In particular, when the power
system has high penetration of intermittent energy resources,
demand altering is crucial due to likely contingencies and
hence more RT price fluctuations. In our simulations’ results,
we considered the pricing data in PJM interconnection elec-
tricity market for the year 2014. We showed that significant
overall cost savings (up to $151,407.7) for a retailer bidding to
this electricity market could be achieved by using our proposed
algorithm throughout the year. This allows the retailer to offer
better deals to the customers and expand its market capacity
and customers can enjoy lower electricity bills as well.
The work presented in this paper can be extended in various
ways. First, recently, PEVs’ battery storage capacity has been
expanded up to 60-85 kWh, e.g., for Tesla model S and model
X [22], which can provide much more elasticity for demand
shaping and demand altering and hence reduce the electricity
costs further. Second, our emphasis in this paper was on active
power, this work can be extended to reactive power as well.
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